CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CASES OF DISCIPLINARY LIABILITY OF JUDGES

Abstract

The article analyses the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in cases of disciplinary liability of judges. Every democracy is guided by a set of fundamental values that apply to each branch of government. These should include the independence of the judiciary, not being arbitrary, and judges should be selected on the basis of merit. There should be a reliable mechanism for holding judges accountable for any possible misconduct. Therefore, it is often argued that judicial independence and accountability are opposing goals. The issue of judicial accountability offers a particular perspective on the broader topic of public trust in courts and the justice system, which includes everything from access to justice to judicial activism. However, it should be emphasised at the outset that judicial accountability to society is also a specific issue, as it involves constitutional and ethical questions of a special kind, where a proper balance must be maintained between the independence of the judiciary on the one hand and the accountability of judges on the other. Disciplinary liability of judges is one of the key mechanisms for holding judges accountable. States are called upon to regulate this area, balancing two main interests – the need to ensure functional mechanisms of judicial accountability and to ensure the real independence of judges. The main international legal instruments on the disciplinary liability of judges stipulate that states shall provide clear rules for which judges may be disciplined, excluding disciplinary liability for minor offences. Regardless of the chosen authority, the judge will be guaranteed a fair trial in accordance with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and will have the right to appeal the decision and sanction. Disciplinary sanctions should be proportionate to the offence committed.